Cooperation, Cognition, and the Elusive Role of Joint Agency

Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
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Abstract

We propose an approach to the evolution of joint agency and cooperative behavior that contrasts with views that take joint agency to be a uniquely human trait. We argue that there is huge variation in cooperative behavior and that while much human cooperative behavior may be explained by invoking cognitively rich capacities, there is cooperative behavior that does not require such explanation. On both comparative and theoretical grounds, complex cognition is not necessary for forms of joint action, or the evolution of cooperation. As a result, promising evolutionary approaches to cooperative behavior should explain how it arises across many contexts.

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2025-03-15

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Joshua Shepherd
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Patrick Forber
Tufts University

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References found in this work

Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.
A Natural History of Human Morality.Michael Tomasello (ed.) - 2014 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Shared cooperative activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.

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