Truth and Metatheory in Frege

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1):45-70 (1996)
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Abstract

In this paper it is contended, against a challenging recent interpretation of Frege, that Frege should be credited with the first semirigorous formulation of semantic theory. It is argued that the considerations advanced against this contention suffer from two kinds of error. The first involves the attribution to Frege of a skeptical attitude towards the truth-predicate. The second involves the sort of justification which these arguments assume a classical semantic theory attempts to provide. Finally, it is shown that Frege was in fact mindful of the need for the relevant sort of justification

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Jason Stanley
Yale University

Citations of this work

Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2018 - In Michael Glanzberg, The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 193-213.
Frege on knowing the foundation.Tyler Burge - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):305-347.
Frege and semantics.Richard G. Heck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):27-63.
Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms.Jim Hutchinson - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):516-541.

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