Hypothetical Consent and Justification

Journal of Philosophy 97 (6):313 (2000)
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Abstract

Hypothetical contracts have been said to be not worth the paper they are not written on. This paper defends hypothetical consent theories of justice, such as Rawls's, against the view that they lack justificatory power. I argue that while hypothetical consent cannot generate political obligation, it can generate political legitimacy.

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Cynthia A. Stark
University of Utah

Citations of this work

Political legitimacy.Fabienne Peter - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Rawlsian Solution to the New Demarcation Problem.Frank Cabrera - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (8):810-827.
Consenting to Geoengineering.Pak-Hang Wong - 2016 - Philosophy and Technology 29 (2):173-188.

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References found in this work

Contractualism and utilitarianism.Thomas M. Scanlon - 1982 - In Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 103--128.
Moral conflict and political legitimacy.Thomas Nagel - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (3):215-240.
Authority and justification.Joseph Raz - 1985 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1):3-29.
In defense of a Hobbesian conception of law.Robert Ladenson - 1980 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (2):134-159.

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