Contextualism, Interest‐Relativism, and Philosophical Paradox

In Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter discusses contextualist and interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox and the Liar Paradox. It concludes that a pure interest-relative account is completely untenable for such cases. Thus, Interest-Relative Invariantism is plausible in the epistemic case only because of specific features of epistemic notions.

Categories

Add categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/0199288038.003.0009

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,101

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Contextualism.Jason Stanley - 2005 - In Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stanley's Three Flaws.Stefan Riedener - 2010 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
Interest-relative invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge.
Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW]Stephen Schiffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.
Interest‐Relative Invariantism.Jason Stanley - 2005 - In Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press.
Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.
Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Relativism.Jason Stanley - 2005 - In Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press.
Interest-relative invariantism and knowledge from ignorance.Federico Luzzi - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):31-42.
Reply to Eaton and Pickavance.Brian Weatherson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3231-3233.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
3 (#1,876,518)

6 months
1 (#1,593,032)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jason Stanley
Yale University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references