Some Worries About the Probability Account of the Feelings of (Un)Certainty

Erkenntnis (2024)
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Abstract

In recent papers, Peter Carruthers and others have argued that the feeling of uncertainty is not metacognitive (i.e., it is not elicited by second-order cognitive appraisals) but is elicited solely by first-order likelihood estimates—a probability account of the feeling of uncertainty. In this paper, I make a case for why a probability account is sufficient to explain neither the feeling of uncertainty nor the feeling of certainty in self-reflecting humans. I argue first that humans’ feelings of (un)certainty vary in ways that their probability estimates on the matter do not, and second that probability accounts elide the essentially epistemic nature of epistemic feelings.

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2024-10-14

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Sergiu Spatan
Technische Universität Dresden

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