Commandments Thou Shalt Not Break

Philosophia 51 (3):1643-1662 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Commanders gain authority from obedience and lose authority from disobedience. We should expect commanders to therefore devise commands that reduce the probability of disobedience. To aid recognition of these techniques for reducing the risk of disobedience, I focus on the extreme of case of commands that reduce the probability to zero. Each of my ten commandments illustrates a logical technique for engineering out disobedience. Once you master these safety measures, you can confidently legislate your own universal maxims. Your innovations will be good news for Immanuel Kant’s characterization of morality in terms of categorical imperatives. The commandments also raise interesting questions about responsibility for necessities and the nature of rule following.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,225

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Legitimacy.Richard E. Flathman - 1996 - In Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Winfried Menko Pogge (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 678–684.
Introduction: Law and disobedience.Peter Jones - 2004 - Res Publica 10 (4):319-336.
Civil obedience and disobedience.Maeve Cooke - 2016 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (10):995-1003.
Masked Protesting.Bernardo Caycedo - 2021 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 28:107-124.
Obeying the law.Michael Sevel - 2018 - Legal Theory 24 (3):191-215.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-12-21

Downloads
26 (#850,497)

6 months
7 (#702,633)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references