Abstract

My dissertation primarily concerns two theories of well-being: hedonism and the desire theory. These two theories are commonly classified as subjective, and thus it is usually assumed that any argument against subjectivity in general, is an argument against both theories. However, I argue that hedonism can be considered to be an objective theory, and that a version of objective hedonism can avoid the problems plaguing subjective theories. ;Subjective theories of well-being claim that well-being should be defined in terms of a subject's pro-attitudes; whereas, objective theories reject this claim. The desire theory is subjective since it claims that a person's well-being consists in the satisfaction of her desires. The general problem with subjectivity is that people can desire things that are not good for them. Most desire theories attempt to avoid this problem by restricting the desires that count to a person's rational desires. I separate these views into two categories: Humean and Kantian theories. Humean theories claim that a desire can be shown to be irrational only by showing that it conflicts with other, stronger desires; whereas, Kantian theories claim that some desires are intrinsically irrational. I argue that Humean theories cannot solve the problem with subjectivity because people can have sets of internally consistent desires that lead them to be worse off. I support this claim by presenting the example of Brave New World, in which people have been conditioned to desire horrible ways of life. Kantian theories can avoid the problem, but I argue that Kantian rationality contradicts the desire theory of well-being. ;I argue that accepting an objective theory of hedonism makes it easier to accept that there are higher and lower pleasures. My view is that complex mental activity that gives rise to pleasure is more valuable than simple pleasure. I argue that this view can solve the problem presented by Brave New World, and therefore it is superior to the desire theory