Personal Identity and Brain Transplants

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29:109-126 (1991)
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Abstract

My topic is personal identity, or rather,ouridentity. There is general, but not, of course, unanimous, agreement that it is wrong to give an account of what is involved in, and essential to, our persistence over time which requires the existence of immaterial entities, but, it seems to me, there is no consensus about how, within, what might be called this naturalistic framework, we should best procede. This lack of consensus, no doubt, reflects the difficulty, which must strike anyone who has considered the issue, of achieving, just in one's own thinking, a reflective equilibrium. The theory of personal identity, I feel, provides a curious contrast. On the one side, it seems highly important to know what sort of thing we are, but, on the other, it is hard to find any answer which has a ‘solid’ feel.

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reprint Snowdon, Paul F. (1991) "Personal identity and brain transplants". In Snowdon, Paul F., Human Beings, pp. 109-126: Cambridge University Press (1991)

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Citations of this work

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Sameness and substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 174 (1):125-128.
Human Beings.Mark Johnston - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):59-83.

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