Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals

In Martijn Blaauw, Contrastivism in philosophy. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group (2013)
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Abstract

This paper argues for contrastivism about the deontic modals, 'ought', 'must', and 'may'. A simple contrastivist semantics that predicts the desired entailment relations among these modals is offered.

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Justin Snedegar
University of Virginia

Citations of this work

Instrumental reasons.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - In Daniel Star, The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond.Jacob Ross - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
The Onus in 'Ought'.Mahrad Almotahari & Brian Rabern - 2023 - Analysis 83 (1):13-21.
One Ought Too Many.Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):102-124.

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References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton, The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 47.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson, The logic of grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Pub. Co.. pp. 64-75.
Ought, Agents, and Actions.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.
Moral skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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