Abstract

The problem of truth was raised in medieval Islamic philosophy within the framework of discussions starting from the question of whether our knowledge corresponds to the “actuality of affairs.” The notion of validity thus elaborated was comprehended as a quality of knowledge established through a comparison with “matters of fact.” What was intended is not coincidence with what is and has existence. Existence (wujūd) was generally understood in Islamic thought as one of the attributes (ṣifa) that a thing might or might not possess while still being “a thing” (shay’), and since our knowledge embraces things independently of their accidental attributes, the question about truth was placed on a wider footing. Validity, from that point of view, testifies that our knowledge conforms with reality in the immediate meaning of the term – thing‐ness. This notion of reality (shay’iyya) does not necessarily exclude Divinity, for God in Islamic sciences is often comprehended as The Thing, although different in every respect (except that of thing‐ness) from all other things. The concept of “thing” serves to introduce something into the current of intellectual discourse rather than to state anything definite about it; to be a thing – that is, fixed and established – means to enter the field of discussion.