Personal identity and time

Philosophia 22 (1-2):155-167 (1993)
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Abstract

Some philosophers hold that the tenseless theory of time entails the "temporal parts" theory of personal identity, that a person is a succession of distinct particulars. Some philosophers also believe that the tensed theory of time entails the "substance" or "continuant" theory of personal identity, that a person is a single particular that endures through time. I argue that these philosophers are mistaken. Both the tensed and tenseless theories of time are compatible with both theories of personal identity

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10.1007/bf02379813

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Identity over time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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