Approximate truth and dynamical theories

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):253-277 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Arguably, there is no substantial, general answer to the question of what makes for the approximate truth of theories. But in one class of cases, the issue seems simply resolved. A wide class of applied dynamical theories can be treated as two-component theories—one component specifying a certain kind of abstract geometrical structure, the other giving empirical application to this structure by claiming that it replicates, subject to arbitrary scaling for units etc., the geometric structure to be found in some real-world dynamical phenomenon. In such a case, a theory is approximately true just if the one geometric structure approximately replicates the other (and if problems remain here, they are problems in geometry, of specifying suitable metric approximation relations, not conceptual problems). This article amplifies and defends this simple approach to approximate truth for dynamical theories.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Point-Free Geometry and Verisimilitude of Theories.Giangiacomo Gerla - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):707-733.
Theory Status, Inductive Realism, and Approximate Truth: No Miracles, No Charades.Shelby D. Hunt - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):159 - 178.
Approximate truth and scientific realism.Thomas Weston - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):53-74.
Approximate Truth vs. Empirical Adequacy.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Epistemologia 37 (1):106-118.
Scientific Realism. [REVIEW]Brian Ellis - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):495-497.
Approximate truth.Thomas Weston - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (2):203 - 227.
Approximate Generalizations and Their Idealization.Ernest W. Adams - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:199 - 207.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
209 (#122,882)

6 months
13 (#248,406)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Twilight of the perfect model model.Paul Teller - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):393-415.
Scientific Realism.Richard Boyd - 1984 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 21 (1&2):767-791.
What is Scientific Progress? Lessons from Scientific Practice.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2):375-390.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

View all 42 references / Add more references