Virtue Ethics, Imperatives, and the Deontic

In From morality to virtue. New York: Oxford University Press (1992)
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Abstract

Terms like ”admirable” and ”a virtue” are not specifically moral, but they allow imperatives and the use of ”should” as readily as moral terms do. This allows our commonsense virtue ethics to say, overarchingly, that we should balance concern for ourselves with or against concern for others considered as a class.

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Michael Slote
University of Miami

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