Sentimentalist Practical Reason and Self-Sacrifice

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):419-436 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACTFor obvious reasons sentimentalists have been hesitant to offer accounts of moral reasons for action: the whole idea at least initially smacks of rationalist notions of morality. But the sentimentalist can seek to reduce practical to sentimentalist considerations and that is what the present paper attempts to do. Prudential reasons can be identified with the normal emotional/motivational responses people feel in situations that threaten them or offer them opportunities to attain what they need. And in the most basic cases altruistic/moral reasons involve the empathic transfer of one person’s prudential reasons and emotions to another person or persons who can help them. Practical/moral reasons for self-sacrifice also depend on empathic transfer and can vary in strength with the strength of the transfer.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,795

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Sentimentalism and the Reasonableness of Being Good.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2013 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 2013 (no. 263):9-27.
Prudential Reasons.D. Clayton Hubin - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):63 - 81.
The central conflict: morality and self-interest.Joseph Raz - 2000 - In Roger Crisp & Brad Hooker (eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 209--238.
A Puzzle About Morality and Rationality.Zhen Chen - 1999 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
The Value of Sacrifices.Jörg Https://Orcidorg Löschke - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):399-418.
Self-Love and Altruism.David O. Brink - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):122-157.
Eliminating Prudential Reasons.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-12

Downloads
50 (#441,704)

6 months
14 (#239,352)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Slote
University of Miami

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.

View all 20 references / Add more references