From Perceptual Categories to Concepts: What Develops?

Cognitive Science 34 (7):1244-1286 (2010)
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Abstract

People are remarkably smart: They use language, possess complex motor skills, make nontrivial inferences, develop and use scientific theories, make laws, and adapt to complex dynamic environments. Much of this knowledge requires concepts and this study focuses on how people acquire concepts. It is argued that conceptual development progresses from simple perceptual grouping to highly abstract scientific concepts. This proposal of conceptual development has four parts. First, it is argued that categories in the world have different structure. Second, there might be different learning systems that evolved to learn categories of differing structures. Third, these systems exhibit differential maturational course, which affects how categories of different structures are learned in the course of development. And finally, an interaction of these components may result in the developmental transition from perceptual groupings to more abstract concepts. This study reviews a large body of empirical evidence supporting this proposal

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References found in this work

Rules and representations.Noam Chomsky (ed.) - 1980 - New York: Columbia University Press.
The origin of concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Rules and representations.Noam A. Chomsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (127):1-61.
Rules and representations.Noam A. Chomsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):1-15.
Thought and Language.A. L. Wilkes, L. S. Vygotsky, E. Hanfmann & G. Vakar - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (55):178.

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