Reasons, inescapability and persuasion

Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2823-2844 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper outlines a new metasemantic theory of moral reason statements, focused on explaining how the reasons thus stated can be inescapable. The motivation for the theory is in part that it can explain this and other phenomena concerning moral reasons. The account also suggests a general recipe for explanations of conceptual features of moral reason statements. (Published with Open Access.).

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10.1007/s11098-016-0639-x

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Neil Sinclair
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Reasons for action: Internal vs. external.Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Morality without Categoricity.Elizabeth Ventham - 2023 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (2):4-1.
What’s So Queer About Morality?Luke Taylor - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):11-29.
Expressivism and Collectives.Michael Ridge - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):833-861.
Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism.Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):649-669.

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References found in this work

Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas E. Hill & Arnulf Zweig.
Slaves of the passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
The sources of normativity.Christine Marion Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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