Rational epistemic akrasia for the ambivalent pragmatist

In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia, The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York: Routledge (2020)
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Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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