Plato and the Tripartition of Soul

In John E. Sisko, Philosophy of mind in antiquity. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 101-119 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the Republic, Phaedrus, and Timaeus, Socrates holds that the psyche is complex, or has three distinct and semi-autonomous sources of motivation, which he calls the reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts. While the rational part determines what is best overall and motivates us to pursue it, the spirited and appetitive parts incline us toward different objectives, such as victory, honor, and esteem, or the satisfaction of our desires for food, drink, and sex. While it is obvious that Socrates primarily characterizes and distinguishes the parts in terms of what each desires and pursues, what is less often brought to the fore is that he also characterizes and distinguishes the parts in terms of how they think. More specifically, he claims that the rational part forms its beliefs on the basis of rational calculation, while the spirited and appetitive parts form their beliefs on the basis of how things appear, without scrutinizing those appearances. Socrates’ dual characterization of the parts of the soul raises a question: why does he characterize each part as having the particular desires and cognitive abilities that he does? In general, how do facts about what a part desires relate to facts about how it thinks? In this paper, I suggest an answer to this question, one that I hope sheds light on the nature of the parts of the soul and so on Plato’s theory of tripartition more generally. I conclude by showing that Socrates’ theory bears a notable resemblance to contemporary dual process theories of judgment, according to which we have two distinct processes for forming judgments, one which is broadly akin to reflection and another to intuition.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Soul Division and Mimesis in Republic X.Rachel Singpurwalla - 2011 - In Pierre Destrée & Fritz Gregor Herrmann, Plato and the Poets. pp. 283-298.
Plato and the tripartition of soul.Rachel Singpurwalla - 2018 - In John E. Sisko, Philosophy of mind in antiquity. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Plato on the Parts of the Soul.Dale Jacquette - 2003 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (1):43-68.
The Presidential Address: The Truth of Tripartition.M. F. Burnyeat - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106:1 - 23.
Are the Parts of the Soul Three or Nine According to Plato?Dimitris Papadis - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 2 (2):245-249.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-11-22

Downloads
853 (#29,124)

6 months
256 (#10,668)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rachel Singpurwalla
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.
Plato's ethics.Terence Irwin - 1995 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 23 references / Add more references