Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?

In Moral skepticisms. New York: Oxford University Press (2006)
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Abstract

This chapter distinguishes different ways for moral beliefs and believers to be justified: instrumentally or epistemically, permissively or positively, slightly or adequately, and personally or impersonally. It explains the two main arguments against justified moral belief: the skeptical regress argument and the skeptical hypothesis or scenario argument. It concludes that these arguments pose a dilemma because their flaws are hard to detect, and their conclusions are hard to believe.

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