Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality and causation

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):349-350 (2010)
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Abstract

Knobe cites both relevant alternatives and defaults on a continuum to explain how moral judgments influence intuitions about certain apparently non-moral notions. I ask (1) how these two accounts are related, (2) whether they exclude or supplement supposedly competing theories, and (3) how to get positive evidence that people consider relevant alternatives when applying such notions

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A contrastivist manifesto.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.

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