What’s Wrong with Restrictivism?

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 33 (2):296-299 (2024)
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Abstract

Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I’m a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.

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A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
Why abortion is immoral.Don Marquis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.
Abortion and miscarriage.Amy Berg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1217-1226.
The scourge: Moral implications of natural embryo loss.Toby Ord - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (7):12 – 19.

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