Three Problems with the Impairment Argument

Asian Bioethics Review 15 (2):169-179 (2022)
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Abstract

In his recent article “Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral: The Impairment Argument,” Perry Hendricks sets out to sidestep thorny metaphysical questions regarding human fetuses and present a new argument against abortion – if impairing a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, then killing the fetus is immoral. Hendricks takes inspiration from Judith Jarvis Thomson’s defense of abortion – that even if fetuses are persons with a right to life, the right to life is not the right to use others, so it is acceptable to induce abortion. Together with Bruce Blackshaw, Hendricks set out to strengthen the impairment argument by appealing to Don Marquis’s future like ours (FLO) account of the wrongness of killing. Here I argue the impairment argument falls short in three ways. First, Hendricks and Blackshaw fail to assume fetuses aren’t persons, broadly construed. Second, they fail to show that impairing a fetus is immoral. Third, they overlook abortions that (merely) let the fetus die. Finally, I argue Thomson’s defense of abortion preempts the significance of the impairment argument; Thomson seems to show that even if killing a fetus is prima facie immoral, women still have the right to induce abortion.

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A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Why abortion is immoral.Don Marquis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.
We Are Not Human Beings.Derek Parfit - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (1):5-28.

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