Abstract

In Chapter V, I argue that the complete rejection of egoism naturally leads to one tenet of utilitarianism which holds that reasons for action should be weighed without regard to their personal origins. I claim that this tenet of utilitarianism is compatible with our moral intuitions, notably those concerning distributive justice. ;Nagel's conclusion is that egoism is the failure to recognize others' reasons for action. He labels this condition, "practical solipsism." In Chapter IV, I contend that as a consequence of his practical solipsism the egoist is unlikely to be happy. My main argument here is that practical solipsism cannot be isolated from a thoroughgoing solipsism, and that this thoroughgoing solipsism prevents the formation of a sense of self. I argue that a sense of self is an important constituent of human happiness. Even if one could develop a primitive sense of self and of others while being a practical solipsist, one couldn't have a conception of oneself as a reason bearer, an agent. I maintain that the lack of that self-conception is not conducive to happiness. ;The third chapter presents Nagel's theory of altruism. If one conceives of oneself as a person among equally real other persons, then rationality requires that their interests generate reasons for action if one's own do. Having recognized others' reasons for action, one will be motivated by them; for Nagel argues that a reason for action is recognized by someone only if it has some motivational force for him. It has been objected that one can recognize others' reasons without being motivated by them. I defend Nagel's argument that the recognition of a reason for action involves being prima facie motivated by it. ;Chapter II explains how Nagel discredits the desire theory by showing that it is uanble to account for prudential action. Nagel's alternative account of prudence is based on the claim that every reason for action has a tenseless equivalent, and that we can derive present reasons from future reasons when they are translated into their "tenseless" equivalents. These tenseless derivations "express" our self-conceptions as temporally extended beings with real futures and pasts. The chapter concludes by considering Richard Kraut's objection to Nagel's "tenseless" reasons thesis. Kraut claims that some reasons, namely reasons to avoid past pain, don't always have tenseless equivalents. I reply that it is the conceptual fixedness of the past which makes it impotent to generate present reasons for action, and therefore the objection does not harm Nagel's thesis. ;The dissertation concerns the foundation of moral action and can be viewed as falling into three parts. The first part explains, defends, and occasionally modifies the theory of moral action given by Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism. The second part uses Nagel's results to show that egoism is incompatible with crucial sources of happiness. The third part argues that Nagel's results support a form of utilitarianism, and that this utilitarianism is plausible. ;Following Nagel, Chapter I describes a theory of action which maintains that every action is ultimately motivated by a desire of the agent. If this "desire" theory is true, then every moral action is also motivated by a desire of the agent. The theory has the advantage of explaining the motivational force of moral concerns, but it has the disadvantages of making moral motivation dependent on contingent desires and open to egoistic interpretation; our moral acts can be viewed as aiming at the satisfaction of our own desires. Nagel rejects the "desire" theory and provides an alternative account of moral motivation.