Epistemic Side Constraints and the Structure of Epistemic Normativity

Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):129-153 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I develop the notion of an epistemic side constraint in order to overcome one of the main challenges to a goal-based approach to the structure of epistemic normativity. I argue that the rationale for such side constraints can be found in the work of John Locke and that his argument is best understood as the epistemic analog to David Gauthier’s argument as to the rationality of being moral

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,486

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity.Chase B. Wrenn - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):273-290.
Epistemic Obligation and Rationality Constraints.Charlotte Katzoff - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):455-470.
Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
Avoiding Epistemology’s Swamping Problem.Patrick Bondy - 2022 - Southwest Philosophy Review 38 (1):163-172.
The Value of Epistemic Norms.Veli Mitova - 2005 - South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):65-76.
The Value of Epistemic Norms.Veil Mitova - 2005 - South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):65-76.
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465-474.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-14

Downloads
56 (#401,341)

6 months
8 (#390,329)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references