Middle Knowledge and the Grounding Objection: A Modal Realist Solution

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (4):1-42 (2022)
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Abstract

This article aims to provide a defense of the coherence of the doctrine of middle knowledge against the Grounding Objection. A solution to the Grounding Objection is provided by utilising the metaphysical thesis of Modal Realism proposed by David K. Lewis (as further developed by Kris McDaniel and Philip Bricker). Utilising this metaphysical thesis will enable the Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom, that are part of God’s middle knowledge, to have pre-volitional truthmakers, and thus, ultimately, we will have a means to finally deal with this problematic issue that has often been raised against this doctrine.

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Joshua R. Sijuwade
London School of Theology

Citations of this work

Conceptions of Supreme Deity.Graham Oppy - 2024 - Sophia 63 (3):389-399.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Grounding in the image of causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore, Claudio Calosi & Damiano Costa - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Modal Realism with Overlap.Kris McDaniel - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):137-152.
Two Concepts of Possible Worlds.Peter van Inwagen - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):185-213.

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