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Justifying Blame: Why Free Will Matters and why it Does Not
Maureen Sie (ed.)
Rodopi (2005)
Abstract
This book shows why we can justify blaming people for their wrong actions even if free will turns out not to exist. Contrary to most contemporary thinking, we do this by focusing on the ordinary, everyday wrongs each of us commits, not on the extra-ordinary, "morally monstrous-like" crimes and weak-willed actions of some.Author's Profile
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Justifying Blame: Why Free Will Matters and Why it Does Not. [REVIEW]Mark Coeckelbergh - 2006 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 1.
Review of: Justifying blame: why free will matters and why it does not/Maureen Sie.-Amsterdam, Rodopi: 2005. [REVIEW]Mark Coeckelbergh - 2006 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 98 (1).
Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting.Maureen Sie - 2005 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (2):67-82.
Mad, bad, or disagreeing? On moral competence and responsibility.Maureen Sie - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):262 – 281.
Valuing blame.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2012 - In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. New York: Oxford University Press.
Predisposed Agency: A New Term for Free Will Because Our Will Isn’t So Free.Randall S. Firestone - 2023 - Open Journal of Philosophy 13 (4):621-645.
Public goods and fairness.Garrett Cullity - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):1 – 21.
The Actor's Brain: Exploring the Cognitive Neuroscience of Free Will.Sean Spence - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work
Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them.Filippo Santoni de Sio & Giulio Mecacci - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1057-1084.
The BCN challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2009 - Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.
Saying something interesting about responsibility for health.Paul C. Snelling - 2012 - Nursing Philosophy 13 (3):161-178.
The Interaction of Learning Styles and Teaching Methodologies in Accounting Ethical Instruction.Conor O’Leary & Jenny Stewart - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 113 (2):225-241.
Moral Agency, Conscious Control, and Deliberative Awareness.Maureen Sie - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):516-531.
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