Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?

In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

This paper explores two kinds of selection effects on experience by the subject's prior psychological states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Such states can influence the selection of objects for experience, or they can influence the selection of experience for uptake in the process of belief-formation. I argue that both kinds of selection effects are rationally assessable, even when the subject is not aware of the influence of her prior states on the selection.

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2012-05-20

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Dialogue and Cognitive Phenomenology.Torrance Fung - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2695-2715.

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