Yet another paper on the supervenience argument against coincident entities

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):613-624 (2008)
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Abstract

Statues and lumps of clay are said by some to coincide - to be numerically distinct despite being made up of the same parts. They are said to be numerically distinct because they differ modally. Coincident objects would be non-modally indiscernible, and thus appear to violate the supervenience of modal properties on nonmodal properties. But coincidence and supervenience are in fact consistent if the most fundamental modal features are not properties, but are rather relations that are symmetric as between coincident entities, relations such as "opposite-possibly surviving being squashed"

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Theodore Sider
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Supervenience.Karen Bennett & Brian McLaughlin - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Getting priority straight.Louis deRosset - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):73-97.
A grounding solution to the grounding problem.Noël B. Saenz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2193-2214.
Supervenience.Brian McLaughlin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
The question of realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):51-91.

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