Truth and Knowledge in Logic and Mathematics

The Logica Yearbook 2011:289-304 (2012)
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Abstract

Logic and mathematics are abstract disciplines par excellence. What is the nature of truth and knowledge in these disciplines? In this paper I investigate the possibility of a new approach to this question. The underlying idea is that knowledge qua knowledge, including logical and mathematical knowledge, has a dual grounding in mind and reality, and the standard of truth applicable to all knowledge is a correspondence standard. This applies to logic and mathematics as much as to other disciplines; i.e., logical and mathematical truth are based on correspondence. But the view that logical and mathematical truth are (i) based on correspondence and (ii) require a grounding in reality demands a change in the common conception of both correspondence and epistemic grounding.

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Gila Sher
University of California, San Diego

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