Abstract

TWO OBJECTIONS are often levelled against Aristotle's theory of practical inference. The first is that he fails to discuss adequately the nature of reasoning about the ends of good living. Thus, while there is no shortage of examples of technical deliberation, such as how a doctor deliberates to bring about healing, we have no comparable examples of how a person of determinate character deliberates to promote the ends of that character. The second is that while Aristotle has an account of how we reason to a decision to act now, he lacks a more general account of intention that can accommodate both present intention and future intention--that is, intending now to act later. The two challenges, I want to argue, are related, though often not by the objectors. Deliberation about how best to live over the course of a life requires a continuing interest in one's future self and a capacity to decide upon future ends that constrain the present and are constrained by it. An Aristotelian conception of the good life, with its intrinsic sense of completeness and unity, requires this close knit of present and future. But if this is so, then the capacity to deliberate about the future and to regulate the present in light of future plans will be particularly urgent in the case of living such a life. Deliberation about future intentions should, if anywhere, play a prominent role here. It will be a severe limitation on Aristotle's view if his account of deliberation precludes such a role for practical reason.