Why There Must Be Something Rather Than Nothing: A New Argument from the PSR

European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This article offers a new argument that there must be something rather than nothing, grounded in the PSR. Inspired by the rationalist tradition running from Parmenides to Spinoza and Leibniz, I argue that there must be something rather than nothing because the contrary would constitute a violation of the PSR. In particular, I argue that, if there was nothing, there could be no sufficient reason for it, since nothing at all would exist to serve as a sufficient reason. Therefore, given the PSR, something must exist after all. After presenting and explaining this new argument, I consider a series of objections and replies, and develop some of its broader philosophical implications.

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Dylan Shaul
University of California, Riverside

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On Some Leibnizian Arguments for the Principle of Sufficient Reason.Stephen Harrop - 2020 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (2):143-162.

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