Why Censorship is Self-Undermining: John Stuart Mill’s Neglected Argument for Free Speech

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 95 (1):71-96 (2021)
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Abstract

Two prejudices have hampered our understanding of John Stuart Mill’s central argument for free speech. One prejudice is that arguments for free speech can only be made in terms of values or rights. This prejudice causes us to miss the depth of Mill’s argument. He does not argue that silencing speech is harmful or violates rights, but instead that silencing speech is a uniquely self-undermining act; it undermines the ground upon which it is based. But even if we overcome this prejudice and appreciate the self-undermining character of Mill’s argument, the prejudice that epistemic justification is a completable task blinds us to the role of open-mindedness in his argument; and failing to see this leads us to wrongly conclude that his argument is invalid. It is only once we have overcome both prejudices that we can appreciate the depth and power of Mill’s argument for free speech.

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References found in this work

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Ethics: twelve lectures on the philosophy of morality.David Wiggins - 2006 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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