Veil of Light: The Role of Light in Cavendish's Visual Perception

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (51):1471-1494 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Margaret Cavendish’s views about the nature of bodies and perception leave her with a potentially problematic implication: that light has no role in visual perception. For her, perception occurs through the self-motion of animate matter, not through a mechanical system that appeals to local motions and collisions of contiguous bodies. This means that motion is not transferred from external objects with light playing a mediating role; the matter of our eyes simply moves itself to copy the sensible qualities of external bodies. However, Cavendish cannot ignore the simple empirical fact that we appear to have visual perceptions in the presence of light but not in the presence of darkness. Light must play some role. I argue that light for Cavendish plays an intermediary role but does not transfer motions as the mechanical model suggests. Rather, light behaves like our eyes by moving itself to form copies of external objects. Our eyes then see these copies. For Cavendish, we are directly acquainted with a “veil of light” rather than the objects themselves.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,337

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Cavendish and Hobbes on Causation.Marcy Lascano - 2021 - In Marcus P. Adams (ed.), A Companion to Hobbes. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 413-430.
Move Your Body! Margaret Cavendish on Self-Motion.Colin Chamberlain - 2024 - In Sebastian Bender & Dominik Perler (eds.), Powers and Abilities in Early Modern Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 105-125.
Visual Perception as Patterning: Cavendish against Hobbes on Sensation.Marcus Adams - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (3):193-214.
Informed by Sense and Reason: Margaret Cavendish's Theorizing About Perception.Deborah Boyle - 2019 - In Brian Glenney, José Filipe Silva, Jana Rosker, Susan Blake, Stephen H. Phillips, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Anna Marmodoro, Lukas Licka, Han Thomas Adriaenssen, Chris Meyns, Janet Levin, James Van Cleve, Deborah Boyle, Michael Madary, Josefa Toribio, Gabriele Ferretti, Clare Batty & Mark Paterson (eds.), The Senses and the History of Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 231–48.
Margaret Cavendish on Motion and Mereology.Alison Peterman - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (3):471-499.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-02-29

Downloads
33 (#685,336)

6 months
12 (#296,635)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Brooke Sharp
Temple University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Margaret Cavendish on conceivability, possibility, and the case of colours.Peter West - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (3):456-476.
Cavendish.David Cunning - 2016 - New York: Routledge.
Margaret Cavendish's Epistemology.Kourken Michaelian - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (1):31 – 53.

View all 16 references / Add more references