Abstract

Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are those who, while putting the ‘intention of the speaker’ (vivakṣā) at the core of their analysis of verbal communication, opt for a formal and technical treatment of the topic. In order to prove through coherent arguments that śābdajñāna is inference and therefore to support Dignāga’s reduction of the valid means of correct knowledge, they all identify vivakṣā with the property-possessor (dharmin) or probandum (sādhya), and śabda (‘word’) with the logical mark (liṅga) or probans (sādhana). They do so to counteract the criticisms of the opponents (Kumārila first of all). Nevertheless, while Jinendrabuddhi, following Dharmakīrti, recognizes the sheer pragmatic value of verbal cognition, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to follow Dignāga more closely and also recognize its epistemic value. The purpose of this article is precisely to describe the essential points of the arguments of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and show their most original aspects.