Hume on practical reason

Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):365–389 (2004)
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Abstract

Argues that Hume was a sceptic about practical reason only on a rationalist account of what it would have to be. (This version differs substantially from the published paper.).

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Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press. pp. 195--219.
The Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press. pp. 195--219.
Hume and the Unity of Reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2024 - In Scott Stapleford & Verena Wagner, Hume and contemporary epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.

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References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison, Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.David Hume - 1751 - New York,: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp.
The Humean theory of motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut, Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.

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