A comparative Study on Gazzali's and Aviccena's Argument of Immaterial Soul

Avicennian Philosophy Journal 21 (58):123-137 (2017)
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Abstract

Avicenna suggests an argument about immaterial soul which was based on intellectual concepts. Gazzali criticized the argument and then restudied it. After that he developed it by another method. The first proposition of Gazzali's argument is different from Avicenna's. In fact, Avicenna's argument is based on intellectual concepts and includes all the universal concepts. While Gazzali's argument is based on the concept of God and the divine knowledge. Both arguments, however, have the same second proposition that is "every intellectual concept is indivisible". Avicenna believed that intellectual concept is divisible in mind. While Gazzali held divine knowledge isn't divisible neither regard to quantity nor regard to conceptuality.Both thinkers have the same problem about the second proposition of the argument, Gazzali criticizes the second proposition but he couldn't solve it and again used it as the second proposition of the argument. This argument obtains a method which consists of reason and gnosis.

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