A Conceptualist Reading of the Continuity Argument

Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 26:223-242 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper I analyze the non-conceptualist continuity argument to show that it implies an implausible conception of perceptual experience in animals that are supposed to lack concepts. In order to do this, I show the limitations and implicit premises in the traditional formulations of the argument, and the additional premises needed to use it as an objection against conceptualism. Then, I review studies in cognitive neuroscience, ethology, comparative psychology, developmental psychology, and philosophical considerations to show that the argument implies a conception of animal experience that is at odds with our scientific theories and even with the motivations for adopting non-conceptualism. I conclude that, if we wish to defend the continuity between adult human’s and other animal’s experiences, we should do it by attributing concepts to the latter.

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