Abstract

This article offers critical analysis of the debate between Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos about distinctive features of empirical science that allow to demarcate it from non-science and especially pseudoscience. Popper's demarcational proposition is explained as involving essentially two requirements, logical (to the theory itself, that it had potential falsifiers) and methodological (to scientists' attitude with respect to the theory, that they were willing to recognise its empirical falsification. Lakatos's criticisms of ‘Popper's basic rule’ that ‘criteria of refutation have to be laid down beforehand’ and Popper's reply to these criticisms, as well as Lakatos's alternative demarcational proposition, are discussed. The argument is made that although Lakatos's criticisms and proposition have considerable merits, he goes too far in claiming that it is OK for scientists to wave away or ignore apparent falsifications of a theory so long as the theory is successful in generating lots of successful unexpectable predictions, and generally understates the importance of the critical attitude for the development of science. On the other hand, Popper's falsificationist approach can be modified so as to accommodate sound points of Lakatos's criticisms and proposition while retaining the basic structure and critical rationalist character of Popper's demarcational proposition.