Abstract

The paper deals with the issue of the implications of the zombie argument, which is one of the most influential arguments in the modern philosophy of mind, for the ontological theories of interactionism, panpsychism, and idealism. It is argued that the zombie argument does not beg the question against interactionism, because it was advanced not against interactionism but against materialism, and supporters of interactionism do not share one of its premises. Accordingly, the argument leaves open the issue of the choice between the main alternatives of materialism – epiphenomenalism, interactionism, panpsychism, and idealism. However, an analogous argument can be advanced against panpsychism, to show that the possibility of explaining the emergence of the mind (self) on the way of attributing phenomenal states to fundamental physical entities is just as problematic as materialistic explanations. It is also argued that idealism, in order to avoid solipsism, should incorporate a version of mind­body dualism: even on the supposition that physical reality has eventually ideal nature, is a system of phenomena of the universal supermind (God), we as mental subjects (our minds, or selves) are something different from physical reality, and any its parts and aspects, – in particular, our bodies and brains.