Occurent-State Metacognitive Reasoning as the Function of Perceptual Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):199-225 (2016)
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Abstract

Based on a higher-order thought theory of what it is for a mental state to be conscious, I argue that a perceptual state's being conscious has a function. The HOT that makes a perception conscious, on my view, enables the perceiver to reason about being in that state. I call this occurrent-state metacognitive reasoning, and identify several varieties of OSM that would be useful to the agent. I further argue that the actualist version of HOT theory, on which a mental state is conscious in virtue of being targeted by an actual HOT, is a better fit with my theory than dispositionalist HOT theory, on which the mere disposition to have a HOT about the perception makes it conscious. On my view, actual HOTs are needed to rationally interact with one's belief/desire complex and thereby prompt OSM.

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