Abstract

There are at least three objections that are commonly made against personalist ethics. Two of those objections which I will not deal with here are that personalism has a tendency to become individualism, a view that stems from a too narrow concept of the person, and that personalism pays insufficient attention to individual, `objective' acts viewed apart from the persons who perform them. While each of these objections deserves separate treatment, I believe that they are easily resolvable on the basis of an adequate and integrated exposition of personalist ethics itself.A third objection against personalist ethics, increasingly heard from specialists in the field of environmental ethics is that personalism is, or at least has a tendency to become, `anthropocentric' and is therefore ill suited to deal with environmental issues. This is based upon the suggestion that personalists automatically presume that the environment exists solely for the purpose and convenience of serving humankind and individuals. Thus, all other creatures are subordinated to human needs and desires. By corollary, something like `rights' will belong exclusively to human beings, and any notion of animal rights or the rights of the environment or a pre-existing eco-system will be categorically denied.The logical starting point for responding to a criticism of any form of ethics would be to determine what that particular form of ethics stands for. Such a determination will sometimes refer to the content of an ethic, while at other times the primary concern will be turned toward method. Thus, the description of a `natural law ethics' would highlight content, in the form of some concept of nature, be this the so-called natural world or human nature, and would emphasize the need to respect the givens of such a system to act ethically. The determination of what constitutes a `consequentialist ethics' would concentrate on method, asking how one isolates and evaluates the consequences of human activity. It is therefore immediately evident that the determination of one `ethics' as opposed to another does not necessarily address the same types of questions.