A Troublesome Case of Backward Causation for Lewis’s Counterfactual Theory

Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):275-294 (2021)
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Abstract

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 275-294, September 2021.

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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.

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