Abstract

This essay examines Kant's relationship to the Stoics with respect to the affective dimension of the moral life. Besides offering a general description and comparison of the two philosophies in this particular regard, it utilizes numerous specific Kantian references to and parallels with Stoicism to argue that his own position was, throughout its development, shaped by a growing contact with and appreciation of the Stoic view. The paper proceeds from some negative remarks of Kant about suppressing or even eliminating the emotions and inclinations found mainly in the Grundlegung and the second Critique, and then goes on to show how Kant was able to draw upon a number of Stoic distinctions and concepts, such as that between the affects and the passions, in order to mitigate these negative and exclusivistic attitudes and to reincorporate the affective components of the personality into his conception of a fully human moral life. Moreover, because of the numerous subtopics explored in making the main case for the Kant-Stoa link, the essay also accomplishes its subsidiary purpose of showing the importance of the sometimes overlooked emotional factor or dimension of Kant's ethics as such.