Abstract

Aristotelian telos is the action's projected goal - what the agent aims at in action - and also, if the action is successful, its accomplished goal. Grasping the projected telos involves grasping how the circumstances of the action, and the telos itself, appear to the agent. Phantasia, appearance, thus captures the internal side of action. The object of aiming, and of desire, appears to the agent as something good, hence for Aristotle valuation is built into the very nature of action. I explore the philosophical implications of this theory of action. I next examine the use Aristotle makes of telos and phantasia in his ethics. I argue that he adopts a dialectical approach there, which starts with appearances of goodness, in order to incorporate insights of Protagorean relativism, while nonetheless affirming the objectivity of ethical judgement. I conclude by looking into the role that dispositions and actualizations play in Aristotle's telos_centered approach to action.