Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions

In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Wiley-Blackwell (2007)
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Tyler Burge (Burge (1979)) has developed a very influential line of anti-individualistic thought. He argued that the cognitive content of a person

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original Segal, Gabriel (2008) "Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions".

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