Dretske on HOT theories of consciousness

Analysis 54 (4):270-76 (1994)
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10.1093/analys/54.4.270

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William Seager
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
An Argument against Causal Theories of Mental Content.Todd Buras - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
In Defense of H.O.T. Theory: A Second Reply to Adams and Shreve.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):231-239.

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References found in this work

Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Thinking that one thinks.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.

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