Abstract

Putnam says that "In one way of conceiving it, realism is an empirical theory." In the present work it is maintained that, in another way of conceiving it, realism is a grammatical thesis. That is, many of the principles taken to be definitive of realism, e.g., "Truth is objective," "Truth is mind-independent," Dummett's "a thought can be true only if there is something in virtue of which it is true," are what Wittgenstein would have called "grammatical remarks." They simply call attention to certain features of the grammar of truth and related concepts. Thus, e.g., it is a feature of the way we use "is true" that statements are not spoken of as true for one person and not true for another. ;The character of grammar and of grammatical remarks in general is spelled out in some detail; it is argued in particular that Wittgenstein is not intending to provide, by means of these notions, a particular account of necessary truth. He is suggesting, rather, that looking upon certain philosophical claims as grammatical is a way of "deflating" them, stripping them of their appearance of profundity. Neither can grammatical remarks imply substantive philosophical theses. This is why realism, conceived as comprising grammatical remarks, does not imply scepticism, as is often supposed, and is not itself a controversial or exciting doctrine. ;There are of course some controversial formulations of realism, versions which are not simply underwritten by grammar. Thus some philosophers have held that, because the truth conditions of a proposition are essentially independent of any evidence we may have for the proposition, truth may not be accessible at all. I believe, however, that Putnam has shown, by means of an argument which is instructively viewed as a grammatical investigation, that truth is accessible, at least to an "ideal" theory. ;Recent expressions of idealism are argued to provide helpful accounts of language use and understanding, but fail to establish that truth is nothing but warranted assertibility, or that it must in some sense "arise within us." Such a conclusion runs afoul of the grammar of truth, of which realism is shown to provide the proper account.