Ethnographic Philosophy: A Qualitative Method for Naturalised Philosophy

Philosophy Compass 20 (3):e70031 (2025)
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Abstract

Recent years have seen a rise in the engagement with empirical methods in philosophy. However, explicit discussion of the method and methodology behind such approaches is scarce, in particular for engagement with qualitative ethnographic styles of empirical research. This entry gathers debates from various philosophical subfields where ethnography has found a philosophical use. First, I introduce ethnography and highlight different versions through examples from phenomenology, political philosophy, ethics and philosophy of science. Then, I address three common challenges raised against the relevance and legitimacy of ethnographic philosophy, some specific to ethnography, others shared with experimental philosophy and integrated history and philosophy of science. The entry ends by suggesting some benefits of ethnographic philosophy, including a potential for genuine surprise, the opportunity to fine-tune and enrichen concepts and a better grasp at philosophical significance in human lives. In addition, I note that ethnography encourages more thoroughgoing philosophical self-reflection about contextual and situational features of philosophical theories and about the particularities of the philosophers developing them, introducing the idea of ‘naturalising the philosopher’.

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Helene Scott-Fordsmand
Cambridge University

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