Abstract

This dissertation is an attempt to fill several perceived lacunae in current defenses of what is called the tenseless or static theory of time . According to the tenseless theory, a fully accurate description of reality includes events and polyadic temporal relations between them, but it does not include any monadic temporal properties like pastness, presentness, or futurity, or any categorially unique entities like a "moving NOW." That is to say, a complete description of reality treats all times and events equally. Ontologically, what we call the past, the present, and the future are on an equal playing field. While this general account is popular today, we ought not to underestimate the scope of the ontological revisions for which it calls. At its heart, the tenseless theory denies the reality of becoming. ;Critics of the theory, typically temporal dynamists , tend to rely on evidence from two general categories: the role of tense and indexicals in language and the primitive or "phenomenological" data of experience. Accordingly, the project is divided into two general sections. The first section is devoted to refining and expanding a tenseless account of temporal indexicals that can withstand the recent criticisms of archdynamists like Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. The second section is devoted to a series of arguments defending the claim that the tenseless theory of time does fully square with the phenomenological data. The point here is not just to show that the theory is compatible with those data, but to show that its general position is entirely consonant with them. Because other defenders of the tenseless theory have not addressed this problem, most of the arguments regarding it are novel, and at times help is found in unexpected places