The Nyāya Argument for Disjunctivism

History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (1):1-18 (2019)
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Abstract

The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. They also gave arguments from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyāya argument may be defensible.

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Henry Schiller
University of Sheffield

References found in this work

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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.
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Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.

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